INSIGNIFICANT FINES: Despite the numerous problems, the biggest single fine at Sago "was $440, about 0.0004 percent of the $110 million net profit reported last year by the mine's current owner, International Coal Group Inc." This is not an isolated problem. "The number of major fines over $10,000 has dropped by nearly 10 percent since 2001," a Knight-Ridder analysis found, adding that "less than half of the fines levied between 2001 and 2003 - about $3 million - have been paid." Last week, White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan defended the White House record: "In fact this administration proposed a fourfold increase in fines and penalties for violations of the Mine Safety and Health Administration rules." This apparently isn't true. While Labor Secretary Elaine Chao has spoken of raising Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) penalties over the last two years, "the administration never actually submitted a proposal to raise those fines."

WEAKENED SAFETY REGULATIONS: Mine safety standards have been rolled back over the last five years. "Under Bush, 17 of 26 regulations proposed by the Clinton administration were dropped or withdrawn, and the agency began a series of high-profile 'cooperative alliance' agreements with industry to promote safety through education, posters and other voluntary programs." The administration has not proposed a single new mine-safety standard or rule during its tenure, according to the AFL-CIO. Two years ago, the administration was urged to reverse this trend. The Government Accountability Office in 2003 faulted MSHA for "failing to follow through when it found violations," and said the agency did "not provide adequate oversight" to ensure that inspectors were enforcing compliance. The Labor Department Inspector General found similar problems in 2002.

OVERSIGHT AGENCY STARVED: Another means of weakening enforcement is cutting back on inspectors. Last February, President Bush asked Congress to appropriate $280 million for MSHA, cutting the number of full time positions in the agency by 146. That proposal was approved by Congress just before Christmas on narrow votes in both Houses. Under President Bush, MSHA leadership also "advocated a less confrontational style and gave inspectors a less-intimidating job title: 'compliance assistance specialists.'"  Former MSHA director Davitt McAteer calls today's agency a "paper tiger."

PUBLIC KEPT IN THE DARK: Under Bush, the MSHA has eliminated or scaled back programs that "allowed public access to records related to safety performance and accident investigations." For instance, the Washington Post noted, the MSHA "halted the release of notes from mine inspections, which the agency had routinely released under the Freedom of Information Act for a quarter-century." According to union officials and former agency employees, the administration also "shifted many routine accident investigations into closed-door proceedings, in some cases denying entry even to union officials and lawyers representing injured mineworkers."

FAILED LEADERSHIP: In 2001, President Bush appointed David Lauriski to head the MSHA. A former mining executive, Lauriski spent the next years rescinding "more than a half-dozen proposals intended to make coal miners' jobs safer, including steps to limit miners' exposure to toxic chemicals." Lauriski resigned in scandal in late 2004 shortly after it was found that the agency had improperly awarded no-bid, single-source contracts to several firms, two of which had ties to Lauriski and one of his assistants. It took a full ten months for the White House to even nominate a replacement for Lauriski and the Senate has yet to act on his confirmation leaving the agency without a permanent director now for 14 months.

MINE RESCUE SYSTEM FLAWS IGNORED: In what the New York Times calls "perhaps the most heartbreaking question raised by a heartbreaking accident," experts are concerned that some of the miners, who survived at least ten hours after the explosion, might have been saved if rescue efforts had begun earlier. Federal law requires mines to have two rescue teams available, "but does not require mines to have their own rescue teams as long as another team can arrive on site within two hours." The first rescue teams in Sago "did not enter the mine until more than 11 hours after the explosion." This precise scenario had been a concern for years. The Charleston Gazette analysis found concerns over the last decade that the mine rescue system "is growing ever short on personnel and is in major need of reforms." Yet in 2002, in direct contravention to recommendations of the Clinton administration in 1999, then-MSHA director Dave Lauriski "halted work on revising MSHA's 15-year old mine rescue regulation."

-- Progress Report, Jan. 10